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PERIPATETIC EPISTEMOLOGY AFTER ARISTOTLE: 
THEORISING KNOWLEDGE  
FROM THEOPHRASTUS TO ARISTOCLES 
ABSTRACT: This paper assesses the evidence for Peripatetic epistemology after Aristotle, in 
particular how the Peripatetics dealt with their Aristotelian heritage. It examines the 
fragmentary remains of Peripatetic works between the death of Aristotle and the first 
century BCE. The account attempts to reconstruct some of the views in logical works and 
those sources which were inspired in part by Aristotle’s wide-ranging views on knowledge 
acquisition and justification. Apart from Theophrastus, the main figures discussed 
(including some of their interactions with other thinkers) are Strato of Lampsacus, 
Hieronymus of Rhodes, Aristo of Ceos, Critolaus, Boethus of Sidon and Aristocles of 
Messene. 
SOMMARIO: Questo articolo si occupa delle testimonianze relative all’epistemologia 
peripatetica dopo Aristotele; si tratterà, in particolare, di comprendere in che modo tali 
testimonianze affrontino l’eredità aristotelica. Il contributo, dunque, esamina i testi 
frammentari delle opere peripatetiche tra la morte di Aristotele e il I secolo a.C. Si tenta, quindi, 
di ricostruire alcune delle dottrine contenute nelle opere di argomento logico e di analizzare 
quegli autori che sono stati in parte ispirati dall’ampia teoria di Aristotele sull’acquisizione 
e sulla giustificazione della conoscenza. Oltre a Teofrasto, i principali pensatori che sono 
qui presi in considerazione sono Stratone di Lampsaco, Ieronimo di Rodi, Aristone di 
Ceo, Critolao, Boeto di Sidone e Aristocle di Messene. Oggetto di indagine sono anche 
alcuni dei rapporti dottrinari di questi Peripatetici con altri filosofi. 
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Introduction 
Peripatetic engagement with epistemology (which, despite its Greek roots, is 
a modern word) continued after Aristotle, but we are not particularly well 
informed about these activities due to the fragmentary survival of the 
relevant materials. Those in the Peripatos continued to debate, read and 
write on ‘how we know what we know’, and often they followed Aristotle’s 
lead. In this essay I take ‘epistemology’ to refer broadly to arguments which 
offer explanations of, and justifications for, knowledge claims. Aristotle 
aimed to determine where knowledge starts and how it can be tested and 
shored up with theoretical principles. He is fundamentally empirical in his 
outlook, starts from perception, and describes how it works (transfer of form 
and logoi) and how reliable the knowledge which one acquires is. The works 
labelled ‘logical’ in the stricter sense such as the Prior Analytics and the 
Categories have a place in my account, but in a less prominent role. How we 
know what we know is primarily clarified in parts of Aristotle’s works on 
perception, in his dialectical treatise Topics, and in the Posterior Analytics 
(APo). 
To answer the question what we know about Peripatetic epistemology 
during the third to first centuries BCE one has to gather the evidence from 
Theophrastus (ca. 371-287 BCE) down to Boethus (ca. 50 BCE) and place 
their efforts in Hellenistic context. The emphasis on how we acquire 
knowledge of the world, what it consists of, and how reliable it is, became 
dominant and influential topics of debate in the Hellenistic period. The 
question the reliability of human knowledge was a result of the debate of 
Aristotelian doctrines, in particular in the Academy under Arcesilaus, who 
questioned his epistemological optimism.1 It forced the students and those 
who saw themselves as Aristotle’s heirs to respond to these attacks. 
My approach will be broadly chronological, with some thematic 
threads across the four sections. Framing the analysis chronologically will 
allow us to establish whether there was any development in the school and 
to examine any shared interests or starkly divergent positions on particular 
topics. While we have a good number of sources for Theophrastus and 
Strato (successive heads of the school), evidence becomes sparser in the 
                                                                          
1 See A. A. Long-D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. I: Translations of the 
Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary, vol. II: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes 
and Bibliography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, section 68. See too 
Harald Thorsrud’s article in this volume. 
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second and first centuries BCE. Fortunately, our task has been made much 
easier because of the recent editions and analyses of the materials from this 
period.2 The fragmentary evidence on physics and metaphysics exhibits 
links to the Aristotelian corpus. Does it also hold for epistemology? So far 
there has not been a focused examination of the evidence for epistemology, 
perhaps because the main areas of philosophy attracting scholarly attention 
are physics, ethics, and politics.  
In the following sections I examine the surviving materials, offering a 
sketch of Aristotle ‘theory’ of knowledge where relevant, then the extant 
sources for Theophrastus and Strato, and I hope to end with some brief 
comments about the revival of Aristotelian studies in the first c. BCE when 
the Categories became a new object of study at Rome. This is not an 
attempt to give a comprehensive account, but rather a selective synthesis 
with the specific purpose of contextualising the ongoing Peripatetic forays 
into epistemology during the Hellenistic era. 
1. Aristotle’s Theory of Knowledge3 
While it will be useful to start with a brief summary statement of 
Aristotle’s epistemology, we immediately face a problem: Aristotle’s did 
not write one comprehensive treatise containing a ‘theory of knowledge’. 
In addition, those works that can be used to recreate such a theory are quite 
difficult to interpret and not always easily harmonised. For the modern 
historian of philosophy this means an account of Aristotle epistemology is a 
reconstruction. As a result, experts will differ on certain details. But in outline 
the following main claims are generally accepted: Aristotle believes in an 
empirical approach to how we come to understand the world around us and 
inherits from Plato the conviction that we need secure knowledge as opposed 
to (unjustified) opinion. His thoroughgoing empirical views widened the gap 
between him and his teacher. This view also influenced his position on the 
relation between (theoretical) philosophy and (medical) science: 
those physicians who are cultivated and learned make mention of natural science, 
and claim to derive their principles from it, while the most accomplished 
                                                                          
2 In particular the Rutgers University Studies in the Classical Humanities series, 
volumes VIII (1998) – XX (2017). 
3 This section revisits and expands on H. Baltussen, The Peripatetics. Aristotle’s Heirs 
322 BCE-200 CE, London, Routledge, 2016, Chs. 3 and 6, and Id., Theophrastus against the 
Presocratics and Plato. Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus, Leiden, Brill, 2000, Ch. 2. 
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investigations into nature generally push their studies so far as to conclude with an 
account of medical principles (Parv. Nat., 480b 21-30).  
To achieve knowledge based on these main assumptions, he constructs 
a theory of sense perception and the soul, pioneers a system of deductive 
reasoning (syllogism), and analyses propositions, word meanings, 
completing this set of basic elements with his so-called ‘categories’, the 
classes of predication.4 Together these allow us to (re)construct a ‘theory’ 
of basic knowledge, but another level is required, that of justification how 
we know what we know. This last component will remain tentative and is 
also still contentious, since the evidence for it in his Topics and APo is 
difficult to harmonise. 
In brief, Aristotle’s theory of knowledge combined deductive 
reasoning and accepted careful observation as a basis for understanding the 
world. However, rather than being a complete system, his ‘theory’ was 
more a set of parameters and principles which were in need of considerable 
development and refinement. As Dodds put it, Aristotle was that “most 
inconclusive of systematisers”.5 His students were also forced to rethink 
some of his propositions, because the debate on knowledge had moved on 
and Aristotle’s theory of perception now came under attack from the 
Hellenistic schools.6 They approached the question “is knowledge really 
possible?” afresh and offered objections to the rather optimistic belief of 
the Peripatetic school that secure knowledge was perfectly possible. The 
ensuing debate impacted on the perspective the Peripatetics had inherited 
from Aristotle.7 All new Hellenistic schools, the Stoics, the Epicureans and 
the Sceptics, raised important issues in this area, and while the central 
debate was between Stoics and Sceptics, we know of several points that 
raised problems for Aristotle’s theory.  
                                                                          
4 The notion of ‘category’ originated in a legal context; the Greek verb κατηγορεῖν, 
‘to accuse’, can be rendered as ‘to claim one thing about another thing’, i.e. ‘attribute a 
feature’. Later debates arise as to whether these are linguistic or ontological classes. 
5 E. R. Dodds, Select Passages Illustrating Neoplatonism, London-New York-
Toronto, The Macmillan Co., 1923, p. 10. 
6 T. S. Ganson, “Third-Century Peripatetics on Vision”, in W. W. Fortenbaugh-S. 
A. White (eds.), Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes: Text, Translation, and 
Discussion, London-New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2004, p. 355-362, has 
argued that the successors did not follow Aristotle’s doctrine of vision, as they reinstated 
the idea of emanations from the eye (Theophrastus, Strato and Hieronymous). 
7 H. B. Gottschalk, “Hellenistic Reactions to Peripatetic Epistemology”, in 
Fortenaugh-White, Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes, p. 375-388. 
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Aristotle had assumed that access to knowledge was in principle 
possible for us, because his account of sense perception presented sense 
organ and object as conveniently attuned to each other (a kind of 
compatibility principle), so that a grasp of their proper objects, colour by 
the eye, odours by the sense of smell and so on (e.g. De sensu 436b16-20) 
would lead to a reliable understanding of the external world. The way that 
the eye worked was analogous to how he envisaged the intellect to work: 
both sense organ and intellect take on the form of their respective object, 
which they can because they are potentially identical to it. So, the 
compatibility principle as applied to the senses, plus the strong parallel 
between sensing and intellection, yields an optimistic account not merely 
of our ability to sense the world accurately, but also to understand it. 
Theophrastus seems to have accepted the main positions, building his own 
account on the foundation of these principles of compatibility and 
transparency.8 
Theophrastus’ and Aristotle’s optimistic attitude toward both 
perception and knowledge was critiqued and modified by the Stoics and 
Epicureans who were also responding to sceptical attacks. The Stoics 
advocated a theory of perception that involved a much more active 
perceiver. We naturally have perceptual episodes that are entirely accurate, 
though there are other episodes that are not. So, while they agreed with a 
restricted version of the compatibility principle, they also thought that it 
takes a very special skill to reliably recognise these ‘clear and distinct’ 
perceptions.9 Scientific knowledge (episteme) involves the ability to do this 
consistently without ever making mistakes. They were much more 
pessimistic than Aristotle about how frequently human beings manage to 
possess this skill and thus to have scientific knowledge. Three problems in 
Aristotle’s theory of knowledge should be mentioned. Firstly, the role of 
his work on deduction, Posterior Analytics, is still subject to debate. It has 
been characterised as a method for justifying knowledge, or for clarifying 
knowledge.10 In the former version, it could be a method for scientific 
                                                                          
8 See again H. Baltussen, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato, Ch. 2 and 
Id., “Strato of Lampsacus as a Reader of Plato’s Phaedo: A Critique of the Soul’s 
Immortality”, in M.-A. Gavray et al. (eds.), Ancient Readings of Plato’s Phaedo, Boston-
Leiden, Brill, 2015, p. 37-62. 
9 Long, Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, text 40K (= Sext. Emp., M, VII, 253 ff). 
10 See now G. Salmieri-D. Bronstein-D. Charles-J. G. Lennox (eds.), “Episteme, 
Demonstration, and Explanation: A Fresh Look at Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics” (4 
Essays), Metascience, 23, 2014, p. 1-35 and D. Bronstein, Aristotle on Knowledge and 
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discovery, in the latter a teaching tool to set out insights already found. 
Secondly, the particular claim about how one may reach the principles or 
starting points of a science (archai) is found in the Topics, generating a 
debate about its meaning and value. Thirdly, it is not easy to harmonise the 
core claims in Topics with APo. I will return to these points where relevant. 
Evidence for Peripatetic epistemology after Aristotle does not provide a 
richer or easier harvest. The evidence is limited and fragmentary – a fact to 
be kept in mind throughout this essay, since it is largely responsible for my 
caution when it comes to extracting any insights and conclusions from the 
texts. But the sum total of evidence can give us a good idea in some areas how 
they dealt with epistemological questions and how they attempted to make 
contributions of their own, even if over time interest in the topic waned. 
2.1 Theophrastus and Strato: Parts and Principles of Knowledge 
The widely accepted view that the students of Aristotle were his followers 
(in the sense of accepting the core teachings) may need some qualification 
when we find them expanding, refining and adjusting these views. 
Renewed attention for the fragmentary remains of their writings has in 
recent decades led to new insights which go against the idea of such a crude 
view of a unified orthodoxy, revealing how many variations of Aristotelians 
there are: self-declared followers, eclectic readers and critics.11 One 
insightful but counter-intuitive suggestion has been that the interaction 
with Aristotle’s ideas may not always have happened on the basis of his 
writings, but simply based on what they knew and remembered from classes 
and conversations with the master.12 This suggestion would hold for those 
who knew him personally and the immediate next generation (e.g. 
Theophrastus, Eudemus, Strato), and could explain the limited references 
to Aristotle’s writings.  
The extant sources show how the Peripatetic interest in theoretical 
discussion of knowledge slowly dwindled and that other areas were studied 
more, in particular rhetoric, ethics and literary pursuits. Most first and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Learning: The Posterior Analytics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (with earlier 
literature). 
11 Cf. Baltussen, The Peripatetics. 
12 See R. W. Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC-AD 200: An Introduction and 
Collection of Sources in Translation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 1-2 
on Critolaus. 
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second generation Peripatetics would continue to work on questions 
concerning nature and our understanding of it, using Aristotle’s writings as 
a springboard, but without considering it as a canon in any strict sense.13 
The theoretical study of knowledge acquisition (perception) in the 
Peripatos after Aristotle’s death continued at a steady pace. This is at least 
what we must infer from the evidence for his immediate successors, 
Theophrastus and Strato. Both embraced the empirical basis of the 
epistemology Aristotle had sketched and focused especially on sense 
perception (the individual sense organs and their objects). Ganson has, 
however, pointed out that they rejected Aristotle’s rejection of the 
emanation theory of vision.14 Several other details point in the direction of 
such a view: Strato (T27A-31 [cf. Diog. Laert., VP, V, 59] Sharples) and 
Hieronymus (T10 White) seem to have been partial to a view that 
represents matter as having a corpuscular nature. 
Gottschalk has argued that there is some evidence to think that 
Hellenistic Peripatetics attempted to update their epistemology under the 
influence of contemporary debates – a plausible suggestion.15 He points 
especially to the account of Sextus Empiricus whose sceptical allegiance is 
responsible for his attempt to review and refute all so-called ‘dogmatics’ 
(Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, Epicureans). The central discussion of 
how mental concepts are constructed reveals the Stoic influence in the 
colouring of the contemporaneous vocabulary and parallels to Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics and the Metaphysics (to a lesser extent). But the opening 
and closing sections in Sextus, so Gottschalk argues, have a different origin. 
Sextus’ discussion of the so-called criterion of truth – an almost mythical 
measure for true knowledge – is out of place: one might with some effort 
extrapolate traces of a reliable measure of truth (‘criterion’) in Aristotle, 
but it is not a doctrine of this concept. Theophrastus’ notion of ‘the self-
evident’ (τὸ ἐναργές; ἐνάργεια) is different and may go some way towards 
such a criterion (301A FHS&G). The idea is that self-evidence can assist in 
gaining an understanding of things. Therefore, we can be sure that the 
criterion could not possibly be Aristotelian, nor could it really be 
                                                                          
13 Ibid., Ch. IX. 
14 Ganson, “Third-Century Peripatetics on Vision”, p. 355. The emanation theory of 
smell is found in Theophrastus De sensu, 9. See also S. White, “Lyco and Hieronymus on the 
Good Life”, in Fortenbaugh-White, Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes, p. 389-409. 
15 Gottschalk, “Hellenistic Reactions to Peripatetic Epistemology”, p. 378-80. In this 
paragraph I use a modified version of a section in Baltussen, The Peripatetics, Ch. 6. 
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Theophrastean.16 The most likely explanation is that Sextus’ claims in this 
discussion must represent Hellenistic ‘modernisations’. 
Cicero seems to confirm the terminological shift. Starting from 
Aristotle’s better-known premises in a syllogism, Cicero discussed both 
Aristotle and Theophrastus in the context of reviewing Stoic logic (Fin. 
IV). In his summative statement he uses the Latin words caput (‘main 
point’) and perspicua (‘very clear’) which are most likely the equivalents of 
the Greek terms arche (‘principle’) and to enarges (‘the self-evident’).17 
They refer no doubt to the doctrine that “first premises of demonstrative 
syllogisms must be undemonstrated, primary and, as such, better known”.18 
Theophrastus, the first scholarch to succeed Aristotle, was very 
familiar with his mentor’s ideas and working practice. They collaborated 
for decades, and Theophrastus modelled much of his own research on that 
of Aristotle. For instance, his plant studies used the tree as an exemplar for 
the whole organisation of the work and to frame the investigation, much 
like Aristotle had used humans as the exemplar in his animal studies.19 
Judging by the list of his works, Theophrastus is seen to have written 
several individual studies connected to perception and knowledge:  
On the senses in 1 book (Diog. Laert., VP, V, 42, περὶ αἰσθήσεων α΄),  
On vision in 1 book (V, 49, περὶ ὄψεως α΄),  
On experience in 1 book α΄ (V, 46, περὶ ἐμπειρίας α΄),  
How many modes of knowing are there? in 1 book (V, 49, τίνες οἱ τρόποι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι α΄). 
We could possibly include On odours (Diog. Laert., VP, V, 44, περὶ ὀδμῶν 
α΄), On affects (V, 45, περὶ παθῶν α΄) and perhaps even On things changing 
colour(s) in 1 book (V, 44, περὶ τῶν τὰς χρόας μεταβαλλόντων α΄). All these 
titles suggest that Theophrastus continued to explore many aspects related 
to knowledge and sense perception. He also looked into issues related to 
the distortion of mental processes, for instance, when people are deranged 
                                                                          
16 Gottschalk, “Hellenistic Reactions to Peripatetic Epistemology”, p. 283-286. 
17 Francesco Verde has pointed out to me that “Cicero’s use of the term perspicuitas (et 
cognati) is (almost always) peculiar of the philosophical position of Antiochus of Ascalon. 
Antiochus indeed uses the perspicuitas or enargeia against the Sceptic Academics who believe 
that our sense-perception is very feeble (see e.g. Cic., Lucull., 17)”. 
18 Gottschalk, “Hellenistic Reactions to Peripatetic Epistemology”, p. 385. On enargeia 
see also K. Ierodiakonou, “The Notion of Enargeia in Hellenistic Philosophy”, in B. Morison-
K. Ierodiakonou (eds.), Episteme, etc.: Essay in Honour of Jonathan Barnes, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 60-73. 
19 G. Wöhrle, Theophrasts Methode in seinen botanischen Schriften, Grüner, 
Amsterdam, 1985.  
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(Diog. Laert., VP, V, 45, περὶ παραφροσύνης α΄) or drunk (Diog. Laert., VP, 
V, 44, περὶ μέθης α΄). Maybe he picked up clues from Aristotle. A nice 
illustration of the second is found in Aristotle, who in discussing lack of 
self-control (ἀκρασία) inadvertently also informs us that men under the 
influence are still capable of a flawed mode of knowledge, by uttering 
“scientific proofs and verses of Empedocles, and those who have just begun 
to learn can string together words, but do not yet know” (EN, VII, 3, 1147a 
15-18; transl. Barnes). The point seems to be that memorisation of such 
materials does not entail understanding or even conscious retention. In this 
particular example due to inebriation (i.e. reproducing the words of 
Empedocles) is a form of mechanical and ineffectual ‘knowledge’, that is, 
he already saw that there is a way to retain information without always 
understanding what it means.20 
Regarding How many modes of knowing are there? (Diog. Laert., VP, V, 
49) we should perhaps take into account Aristotle’s comments in Prior 
Analytics (APr) II, 21, 67b 3-5, where he defines the verb ἐπίστασθαι in 
three ways: “to know is said in three ways, either in a general sense or in a 
specific sense or by activity, so that it is possible to be mistaken (ἠπατήσθαι) 
in an equal number of ways” (transl. Barnes). 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II, 19 is often used for clarifying his 
views on knowledge acquisition, in combination with parts of the On sense 
perception, On the soul.21 In the APo II, 19 Aristotle sets out some sound 
principles: crudely put, we acquire knowledge through the senses, we 
synthesise the specific sense data into a more coherent image, we retain it in 
our soul (role of memory), and we reason about its truth value by way of 
propositions and inference (99b26-100a8). It has been noted by scholars 
that the passage may well contain a response to Plato’s Meno, where he 
asked the question how we learn, including the famous paradox how it is 
that we can make a start finding out (about) something we do not know.22 
                                                                          
20 I discuss memory in H. Baltussen, “Memory, Education and Science. Internal and 
External Memory and the Rise of Ancient Science”, in B. Dignas (ed.), A Cultural History 
of Memory (6 vols., Bloomsbury), vol. 1: Antiquity [forthcoming]. 
21 In EN, VI and Metaph., IV and VI we find further information on how Aristotle 
articulates the practical use of intellectual virtues (EN) and what the underlying 
foundations are (Metaph.). The next three paragraphs reiterate my account in Baltussen, 
The Peripatetics, p. 72-74 with some modifications. 
22 See P. Adamson, “Posterior Analytics 2.19: A Dialogue with Plato?”, in V. Harte-
M. M. McCabe-W. Sharples-A. Sheppard (eds.), Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato, 
London, Institute of Classical Studies, 2010, p. 1-19 (with previous literature). 
Han Baltussen 
62  
Aristotle is more explicit in reasoning about the foundations logically, 
which questions one should ask (and which not), and how to establish 
definitions and demonstrations to arrive at knowledge that is secure. Here 
he may also follow Plato in assuming there is an important difference 
between belief (doxa) and scientific knowledge (episteme).  
Aristotle stays rather close to his teacher (EN, VI, 1, 1139a 5-15) 
when he defines episteme in a two-pronged definition: in line with the two 
parts of the rational soul he proposes to distinguish between a “calculating 
part (to logistikon) and the scientific part (to epistemonikon), where the 
calculating part considers things which admit of change (it is discursive), 
whereas with the scientific part [considers] things which do not admit of 
change”.23 But in his Posterior Analytics he describes a fully deductive 
system which seems to aim at justifying knowledge after it has been 
acquired. He clearly offers good reasons why not all knowledge is 
demonstrable, in particular because one needs to have “pre-existing 
knowledge in order to gain new knowledge” (APo, II, 19, 99b 26-29).24 
We have an interesting passage which claims to report on 
Theophrastus’ notion of the ‘criterion of truth’ (kriterion), preserved by the 
sceptic and physician Sextus Empiricus in his summary of the Peripatetic 
theory of the ‘double criterion’.25 The general tendency of his report about 
Theophrastus fits the information we have elsewhere (see below): knowledge 
comes from the senses and thought, and therefore they maintain that the 
‘criterion’ (truth measure for justified knowledge) is also two-fold: 
“perception for perceptible things, thought for thinkable things” (Sext. 
Emp., M, VII, 218 = part of T301A FHS&G; transl. Fortenbaugh, Huby, 
Sharples and Gutas). It is, however, uncertain whether Theophrastus used 
the term kriterion, and it would seem unlikely.26 That said, it is clear that he 
                                                                          
23 R. Parry, “Episteme and Techne”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition): https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/episteme-
techne/ [08.11.2018]. 
24 Adamson, “Posterior analytics 2.19: A Dialogue with Plato?”, p. 5, with reference 
to APo I, 1. A recent and more detailed discussion in Bronstein, Aristotle on Knowledge 
and Learning. 
25 J. Barnes, “Peripatetic Epistemology: 100BC-200AD”, in R. W. Sharples-R. R. K. 
Sorabji (eds.), Greek and Roman Philosophy, 100 BC-200 AD, 2 vols., London, Institute of 
Classical Studies, 2007, II, p. 547-562, esp. p. 550-551; cf. Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy, 
text 14F.  
26 On the reasons for doubting this, see Gottschalk, “Hellenistic Reactions to 
Peripatetic Epistemology” and Barnes, “Peripatetic Epistemology”.  
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joined in the debate on the certainty of knowledge, and offered his own 
empiricist view.27 Perhaps we should consider his comment in the short 
work On First principles (formerly Metaphysics) where he insists that 
“knowledge is impossible without some differentia” (τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἄνευ 
διαφορᾶς τινος): could he mean a distinguishing difference as the mark for 
deciding that we know (something)?28 If so, then this could come close to a 
criterion, i.e. a basic marker that could decide (krinein) on whether we can 
meaningfully interpret sense data. 
The question how damaging the sceptical stance could be for any 
knowledge claim became a major concern for all philosophers who believed 
that firm knowledge is possible, the Aristotelians included. Aristotle had 
already made a concerted effort to refute the sceptical stance in his 
Metaphysics, turning the tables on anyone claiming that secure knowledge 
is impossible: his ingenious proof of the most secure principle of non-
contradiction (Metaph., Γ) implies that saying anything will mean that one 
has committed to a claim. 
Theophrastus’ work in logic contributes some epistemological 
positions. Together with Eudemus he contributed a number of new ideas 
to logic. Aristotle had worked on a descriptive system of argumentation, 
the first second-order language of research. This early form of scientific 
methodology was a mix of logical principles and rhetorical habits, since 
forms of presentation and manipulation were combined with rules of 
consistency and rigor. The syllogism is a form of reasoning defined by 
Aristotle where two given propositions produce a conclusion in which the 
middle term explains the connection (cause) between the first and third 
statement. Aristotle distinguished a number of these figures. Theophrastus 
expanded on the relation between the second and third figures, and he 
revised Aristotle’s modal logic,29 suggesting that in a chain of reasoning the 
                                                                          
27 To the extent that the criterion has a foundationalist role, we may perhaps relate it 
to several fragments on principles in physics (FHS&G 142-144), on which see esp. A. 
Laks, ‟Le début d’une physique. Ordre, extension et nature des fragments 142-144 A/B de 
Théophraste”, in J. M. van Ophuijsen-M. van Raalte (eds.), Theophrastus. Reappraising the 
Sources, London-New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1998, p. 143-169. 
28 See F. Verde, “L’empirismo di Teofrasto e la meteorologia epicurea”, Rivista di 
Filosofia Neo-Scolastica [forthcoming], building on L. Repici (ed.), Teofrasto. Metafisica, 
Roma, Carocci, 2013, p. 210 ff. 
29 See J. Barnes, “Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic”, in W. W. Fortenbaugh 
(ed.), Theophrastus of Eresos. On His Life and Work, New Brunswick-Oxford, Transaction 
Publishers, 1985, p. 125-141 (a useful analysis of the expansion of syllogistic by 
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conclusion follows the weaker premise, not the major (a kind of weakest 
link principle). He also worked on rhetoric and dialectic. For the latter he 
proposed to adjust the system of dialectical predication, subsuming the 
four predicables under definition, perhaps to create “a single universal 
method”, which Aristotle had considered impossible or unhelpful 
(Alexander of Aphrodisias agreed, T124A-B FHS&G),30 and he provides 
us with a definition of the dialectical τόπος (not found in Aristotle) as an 
argumentative strategy or principle “from which we can take the starting-
points (of argument) about each matter” (ἐστίν ἀρχή τις ἢ στοιχεῖον, ἀφ᾿ οὖ 
λαμβάνομεν τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς, T122B FHS&G). This looks very close 
to the statement Aristotle’s made in Topics, A, 2, 101a 35-37, when he 
discussed the possible functions dialectical training could lead to, in 
particular the search for archai “principles or starting points”, on the basis 
of endoxa (cf. Top., Θ, 14, 163a 36-b 4, b 9-16).31 He is said to have 
introduced a doctrine of hypothetical syllogisms (T111A-113D FHS&G), 
possibly in collaboration with Eudemus, as al-Farabi’s testimony suggests 
(T111C), while also informing us that Aristotle hardly dealt with 
hypothetical syllogisms.  
While the surviving fragments of Eudemus’ works do not seem to 
consider the question of ‘knowing how we know’ explicitly, the material 
allows us to show that he worked on problems related to the Categories (T 
20B), Analytics and to a lesser degree on metaphysics. We cannot overcome 
the limitations of the evidence in this instance. Texts 16A-*18 SOD&G32 
illustrate engagement with metaphysical issues, while texts 20-51 discuss in 
detail a range of questions on propositions, syllogisms, the conversion of 
propositions, etc. According to Alexander (T25A) Eudemus and 
Theophrastus tried to offer a simpler proof “that the universal negative is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Theophrastus), and Id., “Peripatetic Logic: 100BC-200AD”, in Sharples- Sorabji (eds.), 
Greek and Roman Philosophy, p. 531-546. See also S. Bobzien, “Wholly Hypothetical 
Syllogisms”, Phronesis, 45, 2000, p. 87-137. 
30 I use ‘T’ for text instead of fragment in the case of sources from FHS&G. For 
Theophrastus it is now common practice to speak of ‘sources’ and ‘texts’ rather than 
fragments. 
31 Discussed in greater detail in Baltussen, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and 
Plato, p. 34-9. 
32 I am grateful for access to the new edition (pre-publication) by Stork, Dorandi and 
van Ophuijsen, van Berkel and Leunissen, which was first presented and discussed at a 
conference in Rome September 2015 organised by R. Chiaradonna, T. Dorandi, E. 
Spinelli, and F. Verde (which I attended). The draft edition in its third version is cited 
here as SOD&G, where G stands for Dimitri Gutas who has clarified the Arabic materials.  
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convertible”.33 According to Apuleius On Interpr. 13, Theophrastus 
“counted five indemonstrables in the valid moods” to the first figure of 
syllogisms.34 It is possible that ‘counted’ (enumerant) merely means 
‘enumerates’ (SOD&G ad loc.), in the weaker sense of ‘listing’ rather than 
proposing a new number. The list of his works (T19 SOD&G) suggests 
writings on Analytics (1a, b), on categories (5), and on verbal expression 
(T21AB SOD&G). These testimonia and texts illustrate an interest in 
questions of logic and reasoning, but offer very little on epistemological 
issues per se. 
2.2 Strato of Lampsacus 
Strato also had an interest in aspects of the perceptive processes, as his list 
of works indicates (he wrote on vision, perception and colours: Diog. 
Laert., VP, V, 59). A useful account in Simplicius’ commentary may assist, 
but whether we are in a position to establish beyond a doubt which 
materials originate in Theophrastus remains moot. It is clear, however, that 
the report does draw on Theophrastus in a number of significant places, 
even as early as In Aristot. Phys., 20, 18-20 Diels:  
 
ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὴν περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρ|χῶν ἀλήθειαν ἀνιχνευτέον 
καὶ Θεοφράστῳ πειθομένοις, ὃς περὶ τῶν τούτου | ζητῶν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Φυσικῶν τὰδε 
γέγραφεν … 
 
the truth about physical principles must be pursued on the basis of the senses and 
sense objects, letting ourselves also be persuaded by Theophrastus who in his 
investigation [of these things] in his first book of Physics wrote the following … 
(transl. mine) 
 
Strato took a serious interest in logic as is confirmed by the list of his works 
in Diog. Laert., VP, V, 59-60 and a telling comment by the Stoic 
                                                                          
33 Alex. Aphr., In Aristot. APr, I, 2, 25a 14-16 = Theophr. 90A FHS&G. The move 
seems confirmed in Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle APr on I, 2 [= Eud. T *25C] and 
Philoponus, In Aristot. APr, I, 2 [= Eud. T 25D SOD&G = Theophr. 90B FHS&G], 
although it is possible that Philoponus depends on one of the earlier authors. Such 
attempts at simplifying could be motivated by pedagogical as well as doctrinal reasons. 
34 Eud. T *26 = Theophr. T92 FHS&G. Cf. P. Huby-D. Gutas, (eds.), Theophrastus 
of Eresus. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary, vol. 2: Logic 
(Texts 68-136), Leiden, Brill, 2007. More in general, on Eudemus’ logic see L. Repici, 
“Problems in Eudemus’ Logic” (Paper presented at Rome conference on Eudemus, 2015 
[forthcoming]). 
Han Baltussen 
66  
Chrysippus (T14 Sharples = Plutarch., De Stoic. rep., 1045F): “In the third 
book on Dialectic Chrysippus says ‘Plato was serious about dialectic, and 
[so was] Aristotle, and their successors up to Polemo and Strato’” (transl. 
Sharples).35 The list of works reveals an interest in dialectic, and he may 
even have taught it (V, 59 Introduction to Topics), as well as in logic stricto 
sensu (V, 60 On the [logically] Prior and Posterior, On the Prior Genus, On 
the Essential Attribute, On the More and Less). His main contribution of 
note seems to have been his monograph On Prior and Posterior, as 
Simplicius informs us (In Aristot. Cat., 422, 21-423, 33 Kalbfleisch = T15 
Sharples) in which he discusses modes of priority in response to Aristotle’s 
Metaph. book 5, a book full of definitions. Strato seems to have offered 
many illustrative examples and focused on particular problems. He used 
concepts like ‘time’, ‘order’, ‘potentiality’, ‘in nature’ and ‘in explanation’ as 
more generic criteria to place the categories in a hierarchy of priority and 
posteriority (T15, 1-5 Sharples).36 Some information on his psychology is 
forthcoming from selective quotations and paraphrases in Damascius 
(T76-81 Sharples). These are strongly polemical and therefore a 
contentious source for his positive views.37 One thing, however, seems 
clear: his criticism of Plato’s dualism.  
3. After Strato 
A gap in the evidence for the late third and the second centuries makes it 
difficult to assess what kind of interests any of the Peripatetics in this 
period had. We are even poorly informed about the school and its 
leadership. The two lists of the scholarchs that survive in two late sources 
do not concur on the succession for this period. One mentions 
Hieronymus of Rhodes as head until ca. 275 BCE, then Aristo of Ceos as 
the fifth head of the school (ca. 250 BCE), but next in the list is Critolaus 
as possibly the ninth school leader in the second century (in 155 BCE he 
                                                                          
35 Ironically, our source author, Plutarch, next reveals that Chrysippus accused them 
of presenting reasoning that was “blind and self-contradictory”. But we cannot take a 
Stoic’s polemical comments at face value. It seems undisputed, however, that Strato 
engaged with dialectic. For further analysis see Baltussen, “Strato of Lampsacus as a Reader 
of Plato’s Phaedo”. 
36 In T16 Sharples Alexander rebukes Strato for “wanting to make an innovation” 
(kainotomesai – a loaded term for unnecessary novelty). 
37 See again Baltussen, “Strato of Lampsacus as a Reader of Plato’s Phaedo”. 
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participated in the embassy to Rome). We may briefly review the evidence 
on perception and epistemology proper for these three individuals. 
Hieronymus of Rhodes’ theory of vision survives in Plutarch’s Table 
Talk I, 8, 626A-B (= T10 White). The passage is incomplete, but allows us 
to conjecture what his thoughts on the matter were. The theory seems to 
align with contemporary views and seems close to that of Strato, claiming 
that “we see by means of the bodies coming from visible objects”. It also 
presumes the presence of pores, claiming that old people close to the source 
of these bodies are disturbed by their density “when they first depart”, 
because in old people “eyesight contains slow-working pores (bradyporos) 
and lacks elasticity”.38 
Hieronymus is often mentioned in connection with discussions of 
pain and pleasure. While these were seen as concomitant phenomena to 
sense perception, they are of interest in that they can also influence the 
transfer of perceptible data. The process may thus experience distortion. 
This topic became more important with Epicurus’ emphasis on pleasure as 
a more widely important aspect of human well-being, against Aristotle who 
only recognised instantaneous pleasures as real (EN, X, 4, 1174a 17-24). 
Pleasure and pain were regarded as belonging both to physiology and 
psychology. Because they straddle these two domains, the ancient evidence 
can be found in discussions of either. But it appears that the interaction 
between Epicurus and some Peripatetics led to an more intense 
consideration of these notions. At least this is what one is led to infer in 
one source where they are juxtaposed:39 
Epicurus [says that] pleasures and pains [relate to] things that are sensed; the 
Peripatetics, that they [relate to] things that are thought. For the same things do not 
seem pleasant and painful to everyone, as [the same things do seem] white or black. 
[= Stob., Ecl., I, 50, 28-29, 476, 23-27;40 Aët., Plac., IV, 9, 11-12; transl. Sharples].41 
                                                                          
38 I here rephrase Baltussen, The Peripatetics, p. 46. My translation is more literal 
than White’s for bradyporos (“not very porous”) since his translation strikes me as less 
clear in expressing characteristics of the eye sight that is of advanced age. For the 
Peripatetic antecedents of Hieronymus’ theory see Ganson, “Third-Century Peripatetics 
on Vision”. 
39 Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy, p. 104, text 14J. 
40 C. Wachsmuth (ed.), Ioannis Stobaei (Stobaeus): Anthologii, Berlin, Weidmann, 
1884, p. 1020 ff. 
41 H. Diels (ed.), Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, Reimer, 1879, p. 397-398. 
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Here we find an expression of the relative value of pleasure and pain, which 
can be experienced differently by different individuals – unlike, as the 
passage suggests, black and white, which apparently do appear the same to 
different individuals. He seems to attribute to colours a more objective 
status compared to pathe like pleasure and pain. 
Evidence for Aristo of Ceos seems to offer little that is useful for our 
purposes.42 T6 (= Them., Or., XXI) points to the interest in Aristotle’s 
‘words’ or ‘arguments’ (λόγους). The editors (SFOD) translate: “both [Lyco 
and Aristo] were engaged in studying the theories of Aristotle”.43 Aristo’s focus 
was not on logic or epistemology, and the surviving fragments point to 
activity in the domain of rhetoric (Exhortations and Erotic dissertations), as 
well as biography (the title Lyco must be a biography of his predecessor), and 
on emotions (On old age, Relieving arrogance), also the preserve of rhetoric. 
Critolaus’ interest in perception and soul hardly survives except in 
very fragmentary form. According to some sources, he defined the soul’s 
substance as aether.44 He also participated in the debate about the role of 
pain (and pleasure). Hieronymus of Rhodes had already declared pain the 
greatest evil, or rather, its absence the greatest good (Cic., Tusc., II, 15 = 
T20B White). Elsewhere Cicero offers an argument as to why 
Hieronymus’ view cannot be accepted (Fin., II, 41 = T20A White): pain 
may be bad, but its absence is not sufficient to attain a good life; nor does it 
follow that not having pain means that one will experience pleasure. Since 
the context is part of a critique aimed at Epicurus, the established 
perception seems to be that Hieronymus’ theory on pleasure is very close to 
his contemporary. We may contrast this with Critolaus’ view, who also 
declared pleasure an evil (Gell., NA, IX, 5, 6 = T23 Wehrli). A very 
probable way to think about it is to regard this as another case of 
terminological cross-contamination in the ongoing discourse of topical 
issues of the day.45 Yet there is not much that one can use to establish a 
theoretical position on knowledge acquisition. 
The first century offers a glimpse of the so-called revival of 
Aristotelianism in the form of exegetical works on the Categories. Boethus 
                                                                          
42 The list of works (frr. 7-8) is interesting in its uniformity: notes, polemic and 
anecdotes. See W. W. Fortenbaugh-S. A. White (eds.), Aristo of Ceos: Text, Translation, 
and Discussion, London-New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2006.   
43 Note the dual verb form here: περὶ τοὺς ᾿Αριστοτέλους λόγους εἰχέτην. (emphasis 
my own). 
44 Baltussen, The Peripatetics, p. 146. 
45 This paragraph is based on ibid., p. 146-148. 
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of Sidon is said to have written clarifying notes (a ‘commentary’) on 
Aristotle’s Categories.46 His work must have been impressive, if we take 
Simplicius’ verdict seriously (In Aristot. Cat., 1, 17-18; cf. 11, 23): “some 
commentators also applied deeper thought to the work, as did the 
admirable Boethus” (transl. Chase). We seem to know most about his 
“responses to criticisms of the categories, and his elaborations of 
Andronicus’ interpretation of the treatise, with important additions and 
revisions”.47 Boethus is described as an exegete (Simpl., In Aristot. Cat., 29, 
30-30, 2; cf. 159, 31-32), and the evidence suggests he may have applied 
word-by-word study of the text (ibid.). His reading of the categories 
(keeping in mind he mostly articulates defensive moves against criticisms) 
has a limited connection to a theory of knowledge, to the extent that the 
categories are seen as dealing with simple concepts and sensible things as 
the objects of knowledge;48 where justification is concerned we do not seem 
to have important statements on implications for such a theory. Meta-
theoretical observations of such a nature are not extant. 
 
I end with a slightly unusual individual, the Peripatetic Aristocles of 
Messene. Although dated to the first century CE and therefore just beyond 
the Hellenistic era in the traditional sense,49 he can inform us about 
Peripatetic views formulated against a Hellenistic school, the Cyrenaics. 
Aristocles is a lone figure about whom we only know by way of reports 
found in the work of the church father Eusebius (ca. 263-340 CE). While 
little has survived of his ‘history of philosophy’ in 10 books,50 the polemical 
parts that are preserved give us no sign that he had unorthodox views. 
According to the editor of the extant fragments, Chiesara:51  
                                                                          
46 Evidence is in Simplicius. See M. J. Griffin, Aristotle’s Categories in the Early 
Roman Empire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, Ch. 6. 
47 Ibid., p. 178; the criticisms seem to stem from Lucius and Nicostratus (ibid., p. 
180-181). For praise compare also In Aristot. Cat. 11, 23. 
48 See the discussion in Griffin, Aristotle’s Categories in the Early Roman Empire, p. 
187-192. 
49 On the date see Barnes, “Peripatetic Epistemology”, p. 548 who offers (no doubt 
tongue-in-cheek) a hopelessly vague dating: “after Aenesidemus” who is mentioned and 
“before Eusebius” who provides us with these passages, i.e. between the first c. BCE and 
the late third to early fourth c. CE. 
50 See M. L. Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene. Testimonia and Fragments, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
51 Ibid., Ch. XXIII. 
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in none of the fragments does Aristocles accept one Platonic or Stoic dogma or refers 
to one anti-Aristotelian doctrine, and none of the testimonies supports the opinion 
that he combined Aristotle’s with Plato’s or Zeno’s principles, that he was a Middle 
Platonist or an Antiochean. On the contrary, most of his arguments are based on 
orthodox Aristotelian principles, and there seem [sic] to be no reason for doubting 
his Peripateticism. 
Aristocles also discussed questions of sensation and sense impressions. 
Given their content, they must have featured in an epistemological 
context.52 Two fragments allow us to examine his claims and the extent to 
which he was conforming to Aristotelian doctrine. They offer a positive 
expression of his views, which align very well with the views we find in 
Aristotle and Theophrastus. It is worth quoting two longer passages, not 
only to illustrate this traditional perspective, but also to get an impression 
of his argumentative style. Aristocles On philosophy fr. 8, 5-6 Chiesara            
[= Eus., PE, XIV, 21, 5-6 = 14C Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy, p. 102] 
presents a broad characterisation of perception, while including pleasure 
and pain as concurrent phenomena: 
In general, sensations and impressions seem to be, as it were, mirrors and images of 
things; but affections [pathe] and pleasures and pains are changes and alterations of 
us ourselves.53 In this way when we have sensations and impressions we look to 
external things, but when we experience pleasure and pain we attend to ourselves 
alone. For our sensations are produced by things outside us, and what these are like 
[determines] the impressions, too, that they produce, but affections are of a certain 
sort on account of us and according to the state we are in. Therefore, the same things 
sometimes seem pleasant, sometimes unpleasant, and sometimes more so, sometimes 
less so. (transl. Sharples) 
The general approach (affections as changes and alterations) fits 
Aristotle’s position (e.g., De an., II, 5, 416b 31-417a 1).54 The sensory 
part of the experience is linked to external prompts, while pleasures and 
pains are considered internal phenomena, which depend in part on the 
“state we are in”. Their relative nature proves how one cannot be sure of 
their proper nature. 
                                                                          
52 Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy, places them in his Chapter 14: “Theory of 
Knowledge”. 
53 It is possible that in the phrase “affections and pleasures and pains”, the first ‘and’ 
can be read explicative, i.e. “affections such as pleasures and pains”, given the gradualism at 
the end of the passage. 
54 One wonders whether the analogy of mirrors is influenced by Plato’s Timaeus.  
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In another significant passage Aristocles offers a broader judgment in 
which he includes the mind (‘intellect’): 
These things being so, we will find, if we are willing to consider, that the starting-
points of knowledge are best laid down by those who employ both senses and 
intellect. Sensation is like the traps and nets and the other hunting implements of 
this sort; intellect and reason are like the hounds which track down and chase [the 
prey]. One must think that better [than the Epicureans55] is the philosophising of 
those who neither make use of the senses at random nor employ affections [such as 
pleasure and pain] in order to determine the truth. It would indeed be a terrible 
thing for those who are by nature human beings to entrust themselves to irrational 
pleasures and pains, letting go of the most divine judge, [namely] intellect. (On 
philosophy fr. 8, 6-7 Chiesara [= Eus., PE, XIV, 21, 6-7 = 14E Sharples, Peripatetic 
Philosophy, p. 102, continues 14C cited above; transl. Sharples]). 
The playful imagery and the alternative view distinguished from the 
Epicurean one illustrate his considerable interest in the issues regarding 
knowledge and the commitment to rational thought in line with 
Aristotle’s ideas. 
One particularly intriguing case of polemic against sceptical positions 
is that undertaken against the thought of one Hellenistic school in his long 
work entitled On philosophy.56 His scathing attack against the Cyrenaics is 
both informative about his presuppositions and philosophical concerns. It 
also informs us indirectly about the Peripatetic positions vis-à-vis the 
Cyrenaics. A small philosophical movement from Cyrene from the fourth 
century BCE, the Cyrenaics combined elements of Socratic and sceptical 
thought. Again Eusebius has preserved some of Aristocles’ arguments in 
short passages. The Cyrenaics focused on pathe, ‘affections’ or ‘experiences’, 
the result of undergoing the impact of an external object (but they can also 
refer to feelings or awareness of something) and considered only these to be 
‘apprehensible’.57 Although this implies a (kind of) criterion of infallibility 
regarding the pathe as internally perceived experiences (“their contents are 
directly given to consciousness and are incorrigibly true”),58 their sceptical 
attitude towards external sensory impressions had major consequences for 
                                                                          
55 For Aristocles’ attacks on the Epicureans, see F. Verde, “I pathe di Epicuro tra 
epistemologia ed etica”, Elenchos, 39 (2), 2018, p. 205-230, esp. 217-221. 
56 Edition of fragments in Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene. 
57 See V. Tsouna, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, Ch. 2 for the subtleties and pitfalls of the vocabulary. 
58 Ibid., p. 53; ‘immediately true’ because there is no distorting intermediary. 
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their philosophical theorising, precluding them from developing an elaborate 
metaphysics and physics. 
Aristocles formulated two distinctive points of attack, so far as the 
evidence allows us to make out.59 Both aim to ridicule the position by 
extracting absurdities from the basic premises.60 The first argument objects 
to the restricted nature of what can be apprehended: only pathe. The 
passage in Eusebius is worth quoting, because it will allow the reader to 
comprehend that his report and criticism may not offer a fair assessment of 
the Cyrenaic thesis: 
These philosophers maintained that they know nothing, just as if a very deep sleep 
weighs down on them, unless somebody standing beside them struck them or 
pricked them. For they say that, when they are being burnt or cut they know that 
they were affected by something. But whether what burnt them was fire or what cut 
them iron, they could not tell. (Eus., PE, XIV, 19, 1; transl. Chiesara). 
I have here italicised the two parts which seem to represent a paraphrase of 
the Cyrenaic claim as to what one can know on the basis of external 
sensory stimuli. They accept that we can know that something burns or 
cuts us but will not allow that we also know what causes these sensations. 
Aristocles focuses on the fact that they exclude knowing anything about 
the external object, suggesting that this causes them to become aware of an 
unpleasant feeling.61 The counter-argument turns on his extending the 
claim from ‘undergoing’ to ‘sensing that they are undergoing’, pointing out 
that this must mean they are contradicting the narrow awareness of 
‘undergoing something’. In other words, he claims there is more to the 
experience than feeling something, but also an added awareness of a 
propositional nature. It is worth quoting the passage: 
one could immediately ask those who say such things whether they know this that 
they experience and perceive anything. For if they do not know, neither could they 
say that they know only the affection: if on the other hand they know, affections 
would not be the only things apprehensible. For ‘I am being burnt’ is a statement 
(logos), not an affection (pathos). (Eus., PE, XIV, 19, 2; transl. Chiesara).  
Obviously, a clever move, although one might object that the negative 
claim about the cause (‘if they do not know’) was merely there to clarify the 
                                                                          
59 I base my summative account on ibid., p. 62-70. 
60 Again, one is reminded of Aristotle’s attack on sceptical position in Metaph., Γ, 2-4. 
61 He does not raise the objection that these reactions presuppose an understanding 
of what ‘burning’ and ‘cutting’ is. 
Peripatetic Epistemology after Aristotle 
 73 
absence of an expected consequence, articulated in conventional language 
of perception. But the point is of course raising a more fundamental issue: 
at the meta-level of making claims about experiences Aristocles exploits the 
inconsistency that may arise, namely, that these should not contradict the 
claims related to the experiences themselves.62 
Aristocles raises further points along the same lines: that the 
apprehension of the pathe “involves knowledge which extends beyond the 
temporal limits of the individual pathe”.63 Aristocles then attempts to extract 
a further inconsistency from the claim, stipulating that three factors should 
be involved in the process of perception: the percipient, the awareness of the 
affected percipient and the knowledge of the external objects: 
these three things must necessarily coexist, the affection itself, what causes it, and 
what undergoes it. He who apprehends an affection must necessarily perceive also 
what undergoes it. For he will not know that something is warm, without knowing 
whether it is himself or his neighbour, now or last year, in Athens or in Egypt, 
someone alive or dead, a man or a stone. (Eus., PE, XIV, 19, 3; transl. Chiesara). 
He can now infer that (as Aristocles insists) awareness of pain includes 
awareness of the percipient. Further problems implied are to do with the 
Cyrenaic claims being insufficiently clear about (a) how one can 
differentiate between pain and pleasure, (b) how it is that we know who is 
undergoing a sensation, and (c) how we are aware of the sense organs 
themselves. Tsouna suggests that a proper response would be to point out 
that “all these elements are built into the concept of apprehending the 
pathe: the richer that conception becomes, the more difficult it will be to 
prove that we are aware of other things than the pathe”.64 
The second objection focuses more on the affected subject. At 
Eusebius PE XIV, 19, 5-7 further comments list certain absurdities that 
follow from the basic claim (reductio ad absurdum): it is absurd if one does 
not know where one is (in heaven or on earth), whether certain basic 
knowledge (three is less than four) is true or not, and in general, that they 
can claim to be doing philosophy at all. Aristocles infers from these and 
other illogical consequences that “they do not understand what we are 
talking about at this very moment” (19.7). This extreme position seems to 
                                                                          
62 For an analysis of Aristocles’ reasoning and how the Cyrenaics might respond, see 
Tsouna, The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School, p. 63-65. 
63 Ibid., p. 65. 
64 Ibid., p. 67. 
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cut the Cyrenaics off from the most basic and trivial everyday experiences, 
including a sense of time and identity. 
We need not follow this polemic much further. It is clear that Aristocles 
came up with some sophisticated objections to the sceptical position on 
pathe and knowledge of the Cyrenaics. It is worth asking why he would do 
so. Was the position of the Cyrenaics considered viable in the first century 
CE and a threat to contemporary claims in epistemology? Aristocles’ 
objections are formulated in a way that uses absurd consequences and 
inconsistency as the main strategy to demonstrate their flawed views, which 
means he constructs his polemics from within the opponent’s position. Yet 
this strategy does not seem an empty exercise for the sake of argument: he 
takes issue with a sceptical view and does so in a way which is in line with 
Aristotelian doctrines. Aristotle himself had battled sceptical tendencies, 
most famously in his counter-argument against the ‘law’ of non-
contradiction (esp. Metaph., Γ, 2-3) which he declared not just a logical 
certainty, but an ontological one.65 Thus Aristocles’ attempt to defend the 
possibility of knowledge of the world can stand as an example of a 
traditional stance against sceptical claims regarding knowledge from 
sensory experiences. To what extent his efforts are related to concerns and 
debates of his own time would take us beyond the scope of this essay. 
Conclusion 
This brief review of the Peripatetic ideas on the acquisition and 
justification of knowledge has shown how difficult it is to extract a 
coherent and continuous narrative from the evidence. Yet clearly there is 
continuity in engaging with questions of logical reasoning, knowledge 
justification and foundational issues for the first two generations after 
Aristotle. The titles and texts allow us to observe Theophrastus and 
Strato actively reading and refining the ideas of their teacher. They 
discussed modes of the syllogisms, added to the hypothetical, and 
commented on the ‘criterion’. Both considered metaphysical problems of 
knowledge justification by examining the basic principles of the natural 
world. In broader argumentative context, such as Aristotle’s discussion of 
principles in his dialectical work, such claims can assume the role of 
foundations at a more abstract level. But we also saw that the kriterion 
                                                                          
65 As Dirk Baltzly has pointed out to me (personal communication April 2017) one 
is reminded of his dismissive remarks on Parmenides and Melissus.  
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was post-Aristotelian, and probably post-Theophrastan, since his concept 
of ‘the self-evident’ (τὸ ἐναργές, 301A FHS&G) is different from the 
criterion as used in the other Hellenistic schools. 
The next generations turned their attention to other areas and one is 
hard-pressed to find appropriate evidence regarding epistemology. The focus 
among the Peripatetics seems to have shifted primarily to rhetoric, biography 
and more literary pursuits. Epistemology after Aristotle was on the agenda 
sporadically, it would seem, and seldom a subject of interest to the 
Aristotelian philosophers in the late Hellenistic era until the ‘revival’ in the 
first century, when the technical works on logic and metaphysics resurfaced. 
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